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Abstract 
This paper characterizes the dynamic effects of net tax and government spending 
shocks on prices, interest rate, GDP and its private components in four OECD countries using 
a structural VAR approach. For the first time in this literature, I propose a structural 
decomposition of total net taxes into four components: corporate income taxes, income taxes, 
indirect taxes and social insurance taxes. The paper provides estimates of the responses of 
macroeconomic aggregates to innovations in these net tax components. The main conclusions 
of the analysis can be summarized as follows: 1) decompositions of total net tax innovations 
show that net tax components have different impacts on economic variables; 2) the size and 
persistence of these effects vary across countries  depending upon the strength  of  wealth, 
substitution, and income effects reflecting the structure of the economies; 3) positive tax 
multipliers reported in previous studies are found only for the corporate income tax in the 
US, Canada, and France and for the social security tax in the US; 4) while we find that private 
investment is crowded out both by taxation and government spending in the UK and the US 
as consistent with the neo-classical model, our results for France and partially for Canada, 
indicate that there are opposite effects of tax and spending increases on private investment in 
line with Keynesian theory; and 5) private consumption is crowded in by government 
spending for all countries except the UK and crowded out by taxation in all countries except 
France. While the former result is consistent with a Keynesian model, the latter is in line 
with neo-classical theory. 
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1. Introduction 
A common approach in both empirical and theoretical studies on fiscal policy shocks 
is to evaluate the response of macroeconomic aggregates to exogenous changes in the fiscal 
policy variables. From a theoretical point of view, the impacts of discretionary fiscal policy 
on the economy hinge on a number of key assumptions. For instance, in examining the 
transmission mechanism of fiscal policy, the presence or absence of forward-looking 
behavior plays a crucial role. If agents do not look forward, expected future changes do not 
have any effect on current-period decisions. Agents with rational expectations, on the other 
hand, do look forward in anticipation of future changes in key macroeconomic variables.  
The empirical evidence, however, does not provide a common picture either. In 
particular, even though the most recent and standard strand of the literature, which started 
with Blanchard and Perotti (2002), shows positive short-term output multipliers resulting 
from government expenditure increases and tax cuts, the estimated size and duration of these 
effects vary across studies. In fact, the magnitude of the multiplier may depend on the 
specification and/or sample period employed. Interestingly, there is even evidence of 
negative government spending multipliers for Australia, Canada and the UK for some sub-
sample periods (Perotti, 2004).  
There is a substantial body of literature devoted to the effects of fiscal policy on key 
macroeconomic indicators using Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) models. For 
instance, Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti and Schiantarelli (2002) investigated the effects of a 
change in fiscal policy on private investment using a panel of OECD countries. Their finding 
that increases in taxes have a negative impact on output is parallel to the findings of 
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 1. In addition, the latter concludes that private consumption 
increases following an increase in tax rates.  
Both of these studies demonstrate that any increase in taxes will reduce private 
investment. Further, Perotti (2004) points out that the impact of any change in tax policy on 
GDP and its components becomes weaker over time. Mountford and Uhlig (2008) try to 
distinguish the effects of fiscal policy shocks for the US economy between 1955 and 2000. 
They envisage three different scenarios: a deficit-financed spending increase, a balanced 
budget spending increase, and a deficit-financed tax cut. They conclude that among these 
three scenarios the deficit-financed tax cut is the most efficient one to help raise the GDP. 
More recently, by employing a new database, Burriel et al (2010) analyze the effect of fiscal 
policy for the US economy and Euro area as a whole. They find that GDP and inflation 
increase in response to government spending shocks even though the output multipliers are 
very similar and steadily increasing after 2000, possibly due to the “global saving glut”, in 
both areas. 
Alternatively, Burnside et al. (2004), Pappa (2009) and Ramey (2007) report a 
decrease in unemployment in response to a positive spending shock. On the other hand, a 
few studies consider the reaction of the real wage following an increase in government 
spending. Among those, Pappa (2009) documents an increase whereas Burnside et al. (2004) 
report a decrease in the real wage in response to an expansionary fiscal policy. 
Some of the stylized facts above appear to contradict either neo-classical theory, real 
business cycle (RBC) model or Keynesian approach. In other words, the sign and magnitude 
of the effect of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates often offers opposite 
conclusions. For instance, following a positive government spending shock, New Keynesian 
                                                            
1
 For a detailed discussion, see also Fatas and Mihov (2001), Tenhofen and Wollf (2007), De Castro and De Cos 
(2008), Mertens and Ravn (2009) and Romer and Romer (2010). 
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theory tends to predict an increase in output, real wages and interest rate and a decrease in 
consumption and private investment. Yet in RBC models, the expansionary fiscal policy will 
lead to a decrease in real wages and an increase in private investment.  
Additionally, economic theory suggests that different forms of taxation have different 
impacts in macroeconomic activity. For instance, Barro (1990) points out that while non-
productive expenditures financed by a distortionary tax have an unambiguously negative 
growth effect, non-distortionary tax-financed increases in productive expenditures are 
predicted to have a positive impact upon the growth rate. Baxter and King (1993) point out 
that financing government spending with lump-sum taxes and distortionary taxes have 
different effects on economy. Gordon et al. (2004 and 2004a) analyze the impact on revenue 
and costs of a substantial change in fiscal policy, such as the effects of switching from capital 
income taxation to consumption-based tax system. They both find that consumption taxes 
and income taxes have different impacts on saving and investment decisions.  
In view of these discrepancies, the central message of this paper is that different tax 
groups have different effects on macroeconomic aggregates, depending on the underlying 
cause of the tax increase. Our results suggest that analyzing the fiscal policy by decomposing 
total net taxes and examining their effect on the aggregate economy provide a more accurate 
picture than treating total net taxes as the fiscal policy variable. To this end, under the 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification scheme, a five-variable VAR model, which 
includes total government spending, total net taxes, GDP, a measure of inflation and the 
interest rate is used as a benchmark for Canada, France, the UK and the US. Thereafter, I 
propose a structural decomposition of total net taxes into four components: corporate income 
taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes and social insurance taxes. The paper provides estimates of 
the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to innovations in different tax groups by 
replacing total net taxes with each tax components separately. In a further step, the responses 
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of the GDP components, private investment and consumption, to a shock to each tax 
component will be examined.  
Decompositions of total net tax innovations will help us assess the macroeconomic 
implications of fiscal policy shocks for four major economies with different economic 
structures. In this context, corporate income tax shocks, for instance, will have a very 
different impact on macroeconomic indicators than an indirect tax innovation. It is, 
therefore, important that we understand the extent to which increases in net taxes are driven 
by one shock or another, before concerning ourselves possible policy responses.   
The main conclusions of the analysis can be summarized as follows: 1) 
Decompositions of total net tax innovations show that net tax components are found to have 
different impacts on economic variables; 2) The size and persistence of effects vary across 
countries depending upon different effects (i.e., negative wealth and output effects, 
substitution effect and income effect) resulting from the structure of the economy; 3) The 
positive tax multipliers reported in previous studies are found only for corporate income tax 
in the US, Canada and France and for the social security tax in the US; 4) As regards macro 
theories, we find that private investment is crowded out both by taxation and government 
spending in the UK and the US which is consistent with a neo-classical model. On the other 
hand, our results for France, and partially for Canada indicate that there are opposite effects 
of tax and spending increases on private investment, which is in line with Keynesian theory; 
and 5) Private consumption is crowded in by government spending for all countries except 
the UK and crowded out by taxation in all countries except France. While the former result 
is consistent with a Keynesian model, the latter is in line with neo-classical theory.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II focuses on the 
identification of the structural shocks. Section III describes the data. Section IV investigates 
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the impacts of the shocks identified in Section II on macroeconomic aggregates of four 
countries. Section V analyzes the robustness of the results and section VI concludes.  
2. The Identification Strategy 
Our identification strategy follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Denoting the vector 
of endogenous variables by  and the vector of reduced form residuals by , the reduced 
form VAR can be represented as 
 = 	
 +       (1) 
where  is a 		1 vector of endogenous variables,  is a 		 matrix lag polynomial, 
and  is a 		1 vector of reduced-form innovations which are assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed with covariance matrix  equal to the identity matrix. In our 
benchmark specification  and  consist of the following variables:  = [, ,  ,  , ]′ 
and  = [

, 
 , 

, 

, 
]′.  
 I start by expressing the reduced form innovations of the government spending and 
net taxes equations as linear combinations of the structural fiscal shocks 

and 
 to these 
variables and the innovations of the other reduced form equations of the VAR, namely:  


, 

 and 
 . This leads to the following formal representation of the reduced form 
residuals: 

 = !


+ !


+ ! 

 + "


+ 
    (2) 


= !



+ !



+ ! 


 + "


 + 

    (3) 
As mentioned by Perotti (2004), in this framework, the coefficients !#
  measure both 
the automatic response of fiscal variable $ to the macroeconomic variable % and the 
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systematic discretionary response of fiscal variable $ to the macroeconomic variable %. The 
coefficients "#
  capture the random discretionary fiscal policy shocks to fiscal policies; these 
are the “structural” fiscal shocks. It should also be noted that we avoid using the Cholesky 
decomposition method. Regardless of the order of fiscal variables, Cholesky 
orthogonalization will not provide consistent estimates of the structural shocks if, as is the 
case here, the !#
&’s are different from zero2. 
Direct evidence on the conduct of fiscal policy suggests the existence of decision lags 
in the sense that it is not possible to learn about a GDP shock, decide what fiscal measures to 
take in response, pass these measures through the legislature and implement them within 
three months as pointed out by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Thus, the discretionary change 
in variable $ in response to a change in variable % is zero. As a consequence, in quarterly data 
the systematic discretionary component of 
 and 

 will be zero: the coefficients !#
 ’s will 
only reflect the automatic response to economic activity. Because the reduced form residuals 
are correlated with the ’s, it is not possible to estimate the !#
 ’s by ordinary least squares.  
We, therefore, need to construct the elasticities of fiscal variable $ to the 
macroeconomic variable % to compute cyclically adjusted reduced form fiscal policy shocks: 

,'( = 
 − !


− !


− ! 

 = "


+ 
   (4) 

,'(
= 

− !



− !



− ! 


 = "


 + 

   (5) 
The next step of the estimation procedure is to decide the relative ordering of the 
fiscal variables to identify the structural shocks to those. While imposing "
 = 0 postulates 
the priority of tax decisions, "

 can be set to zero if government spending decisions are 
deemed to come first. It might be hard to find plausible arguments that fully justify any of 
                                                            
2 For details, see Perotti (2004) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
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these orderings. In the baseline specification the latter assumption is employed. The reverse 
ordering does not affect the results given the low correlation between the two reduced form 
fiscal shocks. 
Consequently, it is possible to estimate "
 by OLS from the following equations: 

,'(
= 

        (7) 

,'( = "


+ 
       (8) 
 Finally, the coefficients of the equations for the macroeconomic variables will be 
estimated recursively by means of instrumental variables regressions. With respect to real 
GDP, the following equation will be employed: 


= +



+ +


 + 

      (9) 
using 
 and 

as instruments for 
 and 

 respectively. Likewise, the price equation 


= +



+ +


 + +



+ 

     (10) 
can be estimated by using  
, 

 and 

 as instruments. Finally, the interest rate equation  

 = +


+ +

 + +


+ +


+ 

    (11) 
can be estimated accordingly once  

 is recovered. After the reduced form of the VAR and 
all the coefficients are estimated, we can proceed to estimate the impulse responses using the 
structural moving average representation of the VAR. 
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3. Specification, Samples and Data: 
3.1 The Data: 
Our sample comprises four countries: Canada, France, the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The benchmark specification of the VAR includes quarterly data on 
government spending (), net taxes () and GDP () all in real terms
3; the GDP deflator 
(), and the Treasury bill rate ()
4.  is defined as public revenues net of transfers, whereas 
 includes both public consumption and public investment. All the variables, except the 
interest rate, are log-transformed. Since the availability of the quarterly fiscal variables, 
particularly for the net tax components, is a binding constraint, the sample runs from 1960:1 
to 2000:4 for the US, 1961:1 to 2000:4 for the UK and 1970:1 to 2000:4 for Canada and 
France. All variables have been seasonally adjusted by the original sources. For all countries, 
the Treasury bill rate and the GDP deflator data are obtained from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics database.  The rest of the data have been taken from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis for the US and OECD World Economic Outlook for the other countries.  
3.2 The Specification: 
Equation (1) is estimated by OLS and the number of lags was set according to the 
information provided by likelihood ratio (LR) test, the Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn 
information criteria and the final prediction error in general5.  
                                                            
3 Following the standard literature, the GDP deflator is employed to obtain the corresponding real values. 
4 The data source defines the Treasury bill rate as the rate at which short-term securities are issued or traded in 
the market. 
5 Most of the time, the information criteria suggest different results.  For instance, while estimating the model 
with corporate income taxes for the US, Hannan Quinn and Schwarz criteria suggest 2 lags, whereas final 
prediction error and Akaike information criteria suggest 6 lags. Here, I choose 6 lags, since 2 lags is often 
regarded as too short to capture enough economic interpretations among variables for a model with quarterly 
data as also mentioned in Kim and Roubini (2008). However, as a robustness check, the model is also estimated 
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In order to obtain the response of macroeconomic aggregates to various tax policy 
innovations, the VAR specification described in the previous section is estimated. Each 
model comprises of the following variables: government expenditures (), tax revenue (, 
measured by the tax revenue of the ith tax group), the GDP (, the GDP deflator () and 
the Treasury bill rate ().  After the benchmark model (with total net taxes and government 
spending) is estimated, we estimate the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to 
innovations in different tax groups by replacing total net taxes with each tax components 
separately. In a further step, we estimate a number of other specifications where GDP is 
substituted in turn by its private components (consumption and investment).  
Following the leading studies in the literature6, the elasticities of taxes to GDP is 
constructed from data provided by the OECD7. We also assume that, in quarterly data, the 
contemporaneous elasticity of government purchases with respect to output is zero8. Given 
that interest payments on government debt are excluded from the definitions of government 
net taxes and spending, the semi-elasticities of these two variables with respect to interest 
rate, !

 and !
, innovations are set to zero9. Furthermore, the elasticity of the fiscal 
variables with respect to real private consumption and investment are equal to the elasticities 
with respect to real GDP component in the sum of both. Finally, following Tenhofen et al. 
(2006), the GDP deflator elasticity is simply the real GDP elasticity of the fiscal variable less 
110. Table 1 provides an overview of the quarterly elasticities in use.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
with the alternative lags and led to very similar conclusions. For an extensive survey of model selection criteria, 
see also Lutkepohl (1991).   
6 For instance, Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Perotti (2007). 
7
 The calculations are based on Van den Noord (2000),  Daude et al (2010). 
8 This is standard in the literature for most of the studies i.e. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burriel et al. (2010), 
Perotti (2004) or De Castro and De Cos (2008) among others. 
9 This is again one of the standard assumptions in the literature. See Perotti (2004), Castro and De Cos (2008), 
Tenhofen et al. (2006). 
10
 The authors mainly follow the assumption that “the response of the nominal fiscal variable is the same to 
both price and real GDP movements, which is, in turn, given by the real GDP elasticity of the real fiscal 
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4. Empirical Results 
 I compute the effects of various types of fiscal policy shocks on the basis of the 
estimated SVAR model. The figures depict the results displaying the impulse responses to a 
1% exogenous increase in the corresponding fiscal variable. In all cases, impulse responses 
are reported for five years and the 90% confidence bands, corresponding to the 5th and 95th 
percentiles of the responses, have been obtained by bootstrapping with 200 replications. In 
this respect, it is worth noting that, the choice of the confidence interval width is wider than 
that of the 68% literature standard.  
 Figures (1)-(4) display the impulse responses of the various macroeconomic indicators 
to a total net tax shock. Specifically, while the response of output in France is statistically 
insignificant, GDP falls on impact in response to net taxes innovations in the US, Canada and 
the UK. While the response of GDP in the European countries and Canada remains 
significant almost for a year, the significant decline of GDP in US11 appears to be more 
persistent, which is in line with the results of Burriel et al. (2010). Moreover, it should be 
noted that, in the UK, Canada and France, GDP tends to increase after ten quarters which is 
consistent with the findings of Perotti (2004)12. 
 In France, private consumption is consistently crowded in even though the increase 
becomes significant after two years which is in line with a Keynesian model. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
variable. Provided nominal prices do not influence real GDP, the GDP deflator elasticity is the real GDP 
elasticity of the fiscal variable less 1”. 
11
 Here, it is worth recalling that I have been working on 0.90 probability which indicates that the bands in this 
study are broader. Therefore, most of the results for US turn out to be significant in 0.68 probability (which is 
the common probability measure in the literature). 
12 
Perotti (2004) finds positive tax multipliers for Australia, UK and West Germany. According to him, it is 
because of the smaller output elasticities of net taxes. However, here, I did not identify any positive impact 
effect. What we are ending up with is that GDP tends to increase after three years in France and almost four 
years in UK which turns out to be rather counter-intuitive. Yet, even though the standard literature studies the 
effects of fiscal policy by employing conventional VARs, it should be noted that the forecasting limitations of 
this methodology for such long horizons advise against drawing conclusions from this result (De Castro and De 
Cos, 2008). 
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we find that private consumption is crowded out by taxation in the US, Canada and the UK 
as is consistent with neo-classical theory. Here, it should also be noted that, due to the 
increase in taxes, as consumers reduce their consumption, the national savings will increase 
lowering the real interest rate in these countries in the medium-run.  
 As regards investment, figures (1)-(4) and (5)-(8) point to the following results: In the 
standard Keynesian approach, an increase in spending may yield either an increase or a 
decrease in investment depending on the relative strength of the effects of the increase in 
output and the increase in the interest rate; but, in either case, increases in spending and 
taxes have opposite effects on investment as mentioned in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
While this is the case in our results for France and partially for Canada, we did not reach the 
same conclusion for the US13 and the UK.   
 Figures (5)-(8) shows the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to an increase in 
government spending. The impact response of GDP is positive14 and significant in all 
countries except the UK. While the size of the response is similar in the US, Canada and 
France, the shape of the impulse response of output is slightly different, in the sense that, 
after an initial rise, GDP starts declining and after about 10 quarters, it slightly rises again in 
France. In Canada, after an initial increase, there is a decrease in output, whereas in the US 
the increase in output is persistent. In the UK, the response of GDP is insignificantly negative 
which is consistent with the results of Perotti (2004) for this country.  
In addition, the behavior of private consumption largely mimics that of GDP: it 
basically increases on impact in the US, Canada and France but decreases in the UK. While 
the former result is consistent with a Keynesian model, the latter is in line with neo-classical 
theory.  
                                                            
13 This is, again, supporting the results of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).  
14
 For the US, this is in line with the positive response estimated by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside et 
al. (2004), Pappa (2009), Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Fatas and Mihov (2001). 
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Government spending shocks have positive effects on the interest rate in three 
countries (Canada, France and the UK) and essentially no impact effect in the US15. It is 
useful to note here that, the former result can be reconciled both with a neo-classical and a 
Keynesian model.   
Figures (9)-(12) present the effects of a shock to social security contributions on 
macroeconomic indicators. As is widely known, social security taxes are levied on labor as a 
payroll tax. A priori, the impact response of output will, therefore, depend on two effects: the 
substitution effect and the income effect.  
Social security tax innovations will lead to a decrease in tax-payer’s after tax reward 
for each extra hour worked, lowering the cost of leisure. Thus, the individual will be willing 
to work less in response to lower reward. This is the substitution effect (SE). On the other 
hand, a decrease in the real wage will reduce household lifetime earnings and, thus, human 
wealth. So, they will not be able to afford additional leisure and, as a result, will supply more 
labor. This is the income effect (IE). The relative magnitude of the two effects depends on 
the circumstances such as the elasticities of labor supply and demand. Hence, the hours 
worked may increase, decrease or remain the same after the tax innovation.  
It is seen from figure (9) that in the US, IE dominates SE yielding a significant 
increase in output on impact. It is also worth noting that the behavior of private investment 
and private consumption mimic that of GDP: it typically increases on impact in this country. 
For Canada, France and the UK, higher social security taxes decline output, which decreases 
significantly and remains significant for five years in France. As far as GDP components are 
concerned, investment and private consumption responses, in general, mimic the GDP’s one. 
Some slight differences may be observed though, particularly in the short-run behavior. The 
                                                            
15
 Note that the interest rate response in the US and UK are insignificant for the entire period.  
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price level in Canada decreases significantly after four quarters and remains significant for 
five years due to the decrease in demand in response to a social security tax innovation in 
this country. However, the opposite behavior is observed in France in the sense that, after a 
significant decline in the short-run, prices insignificantly rise in the medium-run due to the 
0.4 % decrease in output in response to a shock to social security contributions.  
The impact effect of the social security tax innovation on the interest rate is positive 
in the US due to the increase in money demand and private investment, whereas the 
estimated impact effect on the interest rate is insignificant for the rest of the countries.  
Figures (13)-(16) present the effects of a shock to indirect taxes on macroeconomic 
indicators. The response of each component is typically similar across countries, hence 
summarizing their shapes is not difficult. Over the whole sample, the impact response is 
negative for GDP in all countries. Because they lower the purchasing power of real after-tax 
wages, indirect taxes lead to a strong incentive to curtail investment as seen in figures. On 
the other hand, since the indirect taxes can be defined as the sales taxes, taxes on goods and 
services, there is a decrease in consumption in response to an increase in tax levels. Indirect 
tax innovations also lead to a decrease in the price level due to lower demand. Note that, 
with the partial exception of Canada and France (where we have seen an insignificant 
increase in the interest rate for three quarters), there is a decline in the interest rate on 
impact in response to an indirect tax innovation. This can be explained by the decrease in 
income and investment levels.  
Figures (17)-(20) depict the responses of the endogenous variables to an income tax 
innovation. Here, two opposing effects need to be taken into account. First, an increase in 
income taxes reduces the household wealth by increasing the present value of household tax 
liabilities. Thus, consumption decreases while saving, interest rate and labor supply increases. 
However, the rise in hours worked will lead to a decline in real wages, therefore, investment 
14 
 
and output increase. This is the wealth effect. Second, the same policy will slow down 
economic activity by decreasing output. Because the money demand depends on income, the 
decline in output decreases the interest rate which partially crowds in private investment. 
The degree of crowding in will hinge on the sensitivity of private investment to income and 
the interest rate. Yet, the final effect of the contraction will be a decline in consumption, 
investment and output. This is the output effect. Hence, the overall effect on macroeconomic 
indicators will depend on these two effects.  
For the US, Canada and the UK, the output effect dominates the wealth effect and 
therefore the impact response of consumption, investment and output are negative. For 
France, although the impact response of output and investment are negative, the output 
persistently increases, and there is an insignificant increase in investment after the third 
quarter. On the other hand, it should be noted that consumption significantly rises in Canada 
and France. There are several ways to explain this16. For instance, Linnemann (2006) applies 
a non-seperable utility function in consumption and leisure in a RBC setup in which 
consumption and leisure are substitutes. The negative wealth effect of the fiscal contraction 
raises hours worked which decreases leisure. The marginal utility of consumption, therefore, 
increases. In order to lessen the negative wealth effect, individuals are willing to work more 
and to consume more which will lead to an increase in consumption. 
Figures (21)-(24) display the responses of the macroeconomic indicators to a corporate 
income tax innovation. The impulse responses show a significant positive response of GDP 
on impact for all countries except UK. This can, again, be explained by the negative wealth 
effect and output effect. Here, the wealth effect dominates the income effect for Canada, 
France and US. Moreover, it should be further noted that the increase in capital income tax 
                                                            
16
 Another plausible explanation takes place when habit formation is included in any model. For more details, 
see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006), Bouakez and Rebei (2007). Alternatively, Corsetti, Meier and 
Muller (2009) modeled a spending reversal effect and ended up with the same conclusion. 
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will be reflected in the prices. It will lower the purchasing power of real after-tax wages and 
therefore the positive impact on output caused by the wealth effect will be accentuated. As a 
result, an increase in corporate income tax will lead to a positive impact effect on GDP and 
all the private components of GDP. Thus, after an increase on impact, private consumption 
and private investment will fall in the medium and the long-run in the US. However, the 
significant positive impact on investment persists for almost three years in Canada whereas 
there is an insignificant increase in consumption. Here, it should be noted that our results are 
in line with and Arin and Koray (2006) and Heppke-Falk et al. (2006)17. It is also worth 
mentioning that corporate income tax innovations have positive effects on impact on the 
nominal interest rate in three countries (Canada, France and the US) due to the increase in 
income and investment on impact; and essentially an insignificant impact effect in the UK. 
5. Robustness Checks 
I performed a variety of robustness checks to our 5 variable VAR specification. First 
of all, a different ordering of the expenditure variables when identifying the shocks was 
employed. So far, government spending was ordered first. Yet, there is no basis for choosing 
one orthogonalization over the other as mentioned in Perotti (2004). Nevertheless, all the 
responses were re-estimated under the assumption that government spending was ordered 
after taxes. The results obtained with this alternative specification were very close to those of 
the benchmark model. 
As mentioned in Perotti (2004), the implementation of lags of fiscal policy could 
undermine the predictability of the estimated fiscal policy shocks. It might require some time 
                                                            
17 The former study is done for Germany whereas the latter is for Canada. Both of the papers ended up with an 
increase in GDP in response to a corporate income tax innovation. According to Heppke-Falk et al. (2002), this 
might result from some sort of reverse causality stemming from identification difficulties due to problems with 
exogenous elasticities. However, this is not the case in this study. Although I am confident that the presented 
elasticities accurately capture the automatic stabilizers, as a robustness check, I re-estimate the SVAR assuming 
slightly different elasticities, without any substantive change of the results. 
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for fiscal policy changes to be implemented and according to the author, the private sector 
might anticipate these changes before the econometrician. However, it is shown in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) that allowing for anticipations of fiscal policy does not 
substantially alter the results. Nonetheless, in order to check the robustness of the baseline 
results, I tried some alternative lag lengths. Even though there were some minor differences 
in point estimates, the results were generally involved in the 68% bandwidth of baseline 
estimates.  
In addition, although we were confident that the elasticities we used accurately 
capture the working of automatic stabilizers, we reassessed the sensitivity of the results was 
assessed by varying those values. First, following Perotti (2004), I assumed a -0.5 price 
elasticity of government spending. The results were, again, very close to the benchmark 
model. The differences were minimal in the sense that there was a slight change on point 
estimates of the impulse responses.  
Finally, I evaluated the sensitivity of the results to different values for the output and 
price elasticity of various tax instruments. It is shown in Cohen and Folette (1999) that there 
has only been a slight fluctuation in tax elasticities over time in the US. Therefore, to see 
whether there is a significant change in impulse responses, the benchmark elasticities were 
replaced with their +- 10% bandwidth values. The results obtained with these alternative 
elasticities were, again, very close to those of the benchmark model. There were only a few 
percentage points change in estimates of the impulse responses18.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper characterizes the dynamic effects of total net tax and government spending 
shocks on GDP, prices and interest rates in four OECD countries using a structural Vector 
Autoregression approach with the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification scheme. 
                                                            
18 The results are available upon request. 
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Moreover, we propose a structural decomposition of net taxes into four components: 
corporate income taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes and social insurance taxes. Our results 
suggest that analyzing the fiscal policy by decomposing net taxes and examining their effect 
on the aggregate economy provide a more accurate picture than treating net taxes as the 
fiscal policy variable.  
The main conclusions of the analysis can be summarized as follows: 1) 
Decompositions of total net tax innovations show that net tax components are found to have 
different impacts on economic variables; 2) The size and persistence of these effects vary 
across countries depending on different effects (i.e. negative wealth and output effects, 
substitution effect and income effect) resulting from the structure of these economies; 3) The 
positive tax multipliers reported in previous studies are found only for corporate income tax 
in the US, Canada and France and for social security tax in the US; 4) As regards macro 
theories, on the one hand, we find that private investment is crowded out both by taxation 
and government spending in the UK and the US as is consistent with the neo-classical model. 
On the other hand, our results for France and partially for Canada indicate that there are 
opposite effects of tax and spending increases on private investment that are in line with 
Keynesian theory; 5) Private consumption is crowded in by government spending for all 
countries except the UK, and crowded out by taxation in all countries except France. While 
the former result is consistent with a Keynesian model, the latter is in line with neo-classical 
theory.  
My analysis sheds light on the interpretation of positive net tax multipliers found in 
the existing literature. Decompositions of net tax innovations will help us better assess the 
macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy shocks and, it is, therefore, important that we 
understand the extent to which increases in net taxes are driven by one shock or another.   
18 
 
The findings in this paper also indicate that existing approaches to modeling fiscal 
policy shocks have to be re-thought. First, the results suggest that the usefulness of the 
existing macroeconomic applied work built on the assumption of “total” tax changes may be 
unclear. In examining the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks, it is seen from our 
results that the traditional priority on net tax shocks may be misleading. Instead, more 
attention needs to be paid to different tax policy instruments.  
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Appendix: 
 
Table 1. Exogenous Elasticities 
 United States Canada France United Kingdom 
,-
./ 1.8 1 1.8 0.6 
,-
.0 0.6 1.2 0.6 1.4 
,-
.1 0.6 0.9 0.5 1.2 
,-
.023 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.1 
,-
4 1.1 1 1 1.1 
,-
5
 0 0 0 0 
,6
./ 0.8 0 0.8 -0.4 
,6
.0 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.4 
,6
.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 
,6
.023 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 
,6
4 -0.1 0 0 0.1 
,6
5
 -1 -1 -1 -1 
,/
./ 1.44 0.75 1.35 0.48 
,/
.0 0.48 0.9 0.45 1.12 
,/
.1 0.48 0.675 0.975 0.96 
,/
.023 0.72 0.525 0.525 0.88 
,/
4 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.88 
,/
5
 0 0 0 0 
,027
./  0.36 0.25 0.45 0.12 
,027
.0  0.12 0.3 0.15 0.28 
,027
.1  0.12 0.225 0.125 0.24 
,027
.023 0.18 0.175 0.175 0.22 
,027
4  0.22 0.25 0.25 0.22 
,027
5
 0 0 0 0 
 
 
: total net tax 
89: corporate income tax 
8 : income tax 
8 :;: indirect tax 
8<: social security tax 
$=>: private investment 
c: private consumption 
: government spending (public consumption +  public investment) 
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Figure 1.  Effects of total net tax innovations in the US 
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Figure 2. Effects of total net tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 3. Effects of total net tax innovations in France 
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Figure 4. Effects of total net tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 5. Effects of government spending shocks in the US 
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Figure 6. Effects of government spending shocks in Canada 
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Figure 7. Effects of government spending shocks in France 
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Figure 8. Effects of government spending shocks in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 9. Effects of social security tax innovations in the US 
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Figure 10. Effects of social security tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 11. Effects of social security tax innovations in France 
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Figure 12. Effects of social security tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 13. Effects of indirect tax innovations in the US 
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Figure 14. Effects of indirect tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 15. Effects of indirect tax innovations in France 
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Figure 16. Effects of indirect tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 17. Effects of income tax innovations in the US 
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Figure 18. Effects of income tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 19. Effects of income tax innovations in France 
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Figure 20. Effects of income tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 21. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in the US 
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Figure 22. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in Canada 
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Figure 23. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in France 
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Figure 24. Effects of corporate income tax innovations in the United Kingdom 
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